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Abstract 
We present an economic experiment on the impact of social information on voter behaviour 
and find strong support for bandwagon behaviour in voting decisions. In total, 418 subjects 
participated in the experiment. Bandwagon behaviour is found among both male and female 
subjects.  
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1. Introduction 
We present an economic experiment to analyse the impact of social information on vot-
ing decisions. Our motivation for this experiment is a gap in the existing empirical literature 
on voting behaviour. While the public choice literature focuses on expressive voting and 
largely ignores bandwagon behaviour in voting decisions, the political science literature con-
tains a number of experimental studies that found evidence for bandwagon behaviour. How-
ever, these are not compatible with the standards of experimental economics. We help to fill 
the gap by applying an economic experiment that, firstly, explicitly investigates bandwagon 
behaviour and that, secondly, meets the methodological standards of experimental economics. 
Our results provide evidence for bandwagon behaviour. 
The paper is organized as follows. After a review of the literature in section 2, we 
sketch a model to identify the impact of social information on voting in section 3. Section 4 
outlines the experimental set-up and specifies the hypothesis. The results are presented in sec-
tion 5. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Review of the Literature 
Social information, i.e. information about others’ behaviour, influences an individual’s 
decision in different contexts. When an individual follows in her decisions the behavioural 
patterns of the majority of a reference group, we speak of bandwagon behaviour (Leibenstein, 
1950, p. 190; Simon, 1954). Bandwagon behaviour is observed in purchasing decisions of 
consumer goods (Leibenstein, 1950; Henshel and Johnston, 1987; Banerjee, 1992), decisions 
over a contribution to a public good, or in charitable giving (Shang and Croson, 2009).  Four 
motives behind bandwagon behaviour are discussed in the literature. First, individuals may be 3 
 
motivated by a preference for conformity (Aronson et al., 1997). Second, social information 
may be seen as a signal about the quality of the good or charitable organisation: An individual 
interprets her observation that many fellow individuals of her reference group purchase or 
consume a specific good as an indication that the relevant good is of high quality. This under-
standing is grounded in the individual’s assumption that her fellow individuals have private 
information which would convince her to act alike if this information were available to her 
(Banerjee, 1992). In a political context, the quality-signal immanent in social information 
and/or the preference for conformity may cause voters to vote along with the expected major-
ity of fellow voters. Social psychology studies provide a third possible motive for bandwagon 
behaviour in majority voting: Here, voters may prefer to have voted for the winning party, 
candidate or proposal when votes are counted (Ashworth et al., 2006). Finally, Hong and 
Konrad (1998) argue that anxiety-averse voters have an incentive to vote along with the ex-
pected majority because this reduces the uncertainty of the election outcome.  
The political science literature contains a number of empirical studies that test for 
bandwagon behaviour in voting. A first group of studies analyses data from large-scale opin-
ion polls conducted in times of upcoming elections or on election days. The evidence from 
these studies is mixed (see the literature reviews in Marsh, 1984; McAllister and Studlar, 
1991; Nadeau et al., 1997). One essential shortcoming of these studies is that it is very diffi-
cult to disentangle the complex interrelations between voting intentions, poll results and other 
pieces of information that drive both of the former simultaneously (Marsh, 1984; Morwitz and 
Pluzinski, 1996; Joslyn, 1997). Avoiding these difficulties, a second group of studies are 
based on experiments. Mehrabian (1998) presents two studies on bandwagon behaviour in 
voting. In his first study, he elicits the intended voting behaviour among Republicans in their 4 
 
primaries for the presidential election in 1996. He finds that the tendency to prefer Bob Dole 
over Steve Forbes depends on the polls presented to the voters. Voters are more likely to vote 
for Dole when he leads in the opinion poll compared to the situation with Forbes leading. The 
second study involves students from the University of California, Los Angeles. These are 
asked to express their approval to proposals for different modes of testing their performance: 
a midterm exam or an extra-credit paper. Mehrabian (1998) uses bogus polls in his studies. 
Results show that bogus polls do not influence the answers when subjects have clear and 
strong preferences. However, bogus polls have an impact when preference relations are weak. 
In this case, bandwagon behaviour in voting is observed. Next to Mehrabian (1998), there are 
a number of others experimental studies that find evidence for bandwagon behaviour in vot-
ing (Laponce 1966; Fleitas 1971; Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1994; Goidel and Shields, 1994; 
Mehrabian 1998). However, the existing experimental studies suffer from at least one of the 
following limitations. First, they largely rely on bogus polls to shape subjects’ expectations 
and they do not explicitly elicit subjects’ expectations with respect to the voting behaviour of 
others. Instead, they implicitly assume that the bogus poll results dominate the real-life infor-
mation that subjects additionally draw on when shaping their expectations (Laponce 1966; 
Fleitas 1971; Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1994; Mehrabian 1998). Goidel and Shields (1994) 
are an exception in that they do not rely on bogus polls but elicit the participants’ electoral 
expectations. They find a positive correlations between an individual’s voting intentions and 
her expectations concerning the voting behaviour of fellow voters. While this result is com-
patible with bandwagon behaviour, it may also result from the so-called false-consensus ef-
fect. While bandwagon behaviour assume that expectations drive behaviour, the false consen-
sus effect implies the reverse direction of causality (Fields and Schuman, 1976; Lemert, 1986; 
Babad, 1995). When subjects form expectations with respect to the behaviour of their fellow-5 
 
subjects, they take their own voting intention as a starting point. Given that subjects system-
atically overestimate the degree to which other individuals share their preferences, they expect 
a large (small) approval rate whenever they intend to approve (reject). Thus, the study of 
Goidel and Shields (2004) does not provide conclusive evidence for bandwagon behaviour in 
voting. Finally, the existing studies do not record actual voting behaviour. Instead they docu-
ment voting intentions (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1994; Goidel and Shields, 1994; Mehra-
bian, 1998). This lack of incentive compatibility reduces the external validity of these studies 
because it lends overdue importance to all motives that are not related to the consequences of 
the voting outcome, possibly among them bandwagon motives. 
Recent studies in experimental economics test for the impact of social behaviour on vot-
ing. However, they do not test for bandwagon behaviour but focus on expressive voting 
(Carter and Guerette, 1992; Fischer, 1996; Tyran, 2004). Tyran’s (2004) experiment is of par-
ticular importance for our study. In line with principles of experimental economics, Tyran 
(2004) conducts a laboratory experiment. He observes voting decisions in situations with 
monetary incentives and does not rely on bogus polls. His experiment implements Tullock’s 
thought experiment on the charity of the uncharitable (Tullock, 1971). Accordingly, subjects 
receive a monetary endowment and they are asked to vote on a proposal to donate their en-
dowment to charity. In Tyran’s experiment, participants can only decide to donate their entire 
endowment or to keep it. Vote abstention is not possible. Subjects can estimate the number of 
their fellow voters. They are informed that the proposal is accepted if the overall approval rate 
a exceeds a publicly announced threshold (t), else it is rejected. All subjects keep their money 
regardless of their individual decision if a ≤ t. If a > t, the endowment of all subjects is do-
nated, regardless of the individual vote. For a given donation issue, five different values of t 6 
 
are used and, thus, all subjects have to take five decisions. Subjects are informed that only one 
of these five decisions is finally chosen at random and executed. Before voting for (approval) 
or against (disapproval) the proposal, each subject is asked to state her expected overall ap-
proval rate for each threshold. In Tyran’s experiment, 56.4 % of participants always approve 
or disapprove independent of the threshold. The remaining participants switch between ap-
proval and disapproval for different thresholds. Among these so-called switchers, only a small 
fraction shows behaviour consistent with expressive voting. The switchers’ decision to ap-
prove the donation at a particular threshold is strongly and positively correlated with the ex-
pected approval rate of others. The same correlation is found for the group of participants as a 
whole. Though accompanied by a note of caution, Tyran suggests that these results may be 
caused by bandwagon behaviour. This note of caution is justified by the fact that – just like in 
Goidel and Shields (1994) – the false-consensus effect provides an alternative explanation for 
the observed regularity.  
In this paper we provide – to the best of our knowledge – the first experiment that ex-
plicitly tests for bandwagon behaviour in voting decisions and at the same time we follow 
methodological standards for economic experiments. We implement incentive-compatible 
mechanisms and provide participants with social information collected in previous experi-
ments with a similar subject pool instead of relying on bogus polls. We test that the provided 
social information shapes expectations and we account for the false-consensus effect.  
3. Model 
In a next step, we present a model to identify the incentives for an individual voter motivated 
by bandwagon motives. As suggested in Tullock’s thought experiment, she has to vote on the 7 
 
proposal to donate a certain amount of money to charity or to keep it for private use. Let xi 
denote the net utility she witnesses if the proposal is rejected (i.e. voted NO). This so-called 
instrumental utility is negative for altruists (xi < 0) and positive for non-altruists (xi > 0). The 
probability with which voter i expects to be decisive is given by pi. In most cases, the ap-
proval rate among other voters is either sufficiently high to accept the proposal even if she 
votes against it or too low to accept the proposal even if she votes in favour of it (Tyran, 
2004). In the following, ri respectively si denote the probability with which she expects the 
first respectively the second case to occur.  Let i denote voter i’s expressive utility from vot-
ing for the proposal. The voter has to estimate pi, si and ri from her expectations concerning 
the other voters’ behaviour. Let  
i a  be the ex ante probability that a fellow-voter votes YES as 
estimated by voter i. The closer  
i a  to 0.5, the higher pi (Beck, 1975). Voter i will vote for 
the proposal if the expected overall utility of approving exceeds the expected overall utility 
from rejecting (Tyran, 2004). 
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 (1) 
For an altruistic voter (xi < 0), inequality (1) is fulfilled regardless of pi and i. She will vote 
YES regardless of  
i a . A non-altruist (xi > 0) who is not motivated by expressive motives will 
vote NO regardless of  
i a . However, if expressive motives are present, her voting behaviour 
varies depending on  
i a . She will vote NO if   () ii p a  is large. However, if   () 0 ii pa  , 
 () 0 ii i i pa x    and thus she will vote YES in both cases. 8 
 
Now we add bandwagon motives. For reasons of simplicity, we introduce an additive term 
 () ii a   to the utility function. It is reasonable to assume that   (0 . 5 ) 0 ii a    and that 
 () ii a  deviates from zero in those cases where voter i can identify a majority to vote along 
with (i.e.   0.5 i a  ). The more  
i a  deviates from 0.5, the larger the absolute value of the band-












The necessary condition for voter i to approve the proposal demands that the utility differen-
tial from voting YES is positive: 
   () ( ) 0 ( )( ) 0 i i i i ii ii i UD U YES U NO a p a x          (3) 
Compared to the situation without bandwagon motives, the expressive voter is more likely to 
approve when   0.5 i a   and less likely to approve when   0.5 i a  .  
Expression (3) also shows that even voters who do not follow an expressive motive as defined 
by Tyran (2004) may vote against their material interest. Under the simple majority vote, 
 () ii a   and   () ii i pa x   are negatively correlated, i.e. the more  
i a  deviates from 0.5, the larg-
er the bandwagon utility   () ii a   becomes and the smaller  () ii p a . For a voter with xi > 0, 
bandwagon motives can make her vote YES if she expects   0.5 i a  . Similarly voters with 
xi < 0 may vote NO if she expects   0.5 i a  . These considerations allow for designing an expe-
riment to tests for bandwagon behaviour. Our design relies on the idea to observe two similar 9 
 
groups of subjects deciding on an identical issue. By an exogenous intervention, we provide 
both groups with systematically different social information about decisions in previous ex-
periments. We can test whether different social information leads to different estimates for the 
expected approval rates among fellow-voters. This is a precondition for our test on band-
wagon behaviour in voting. If this precondition holds but the approval rates between groups 
do not differ, bandwagon behaviour does not show. If, however, the precondition holds and 
we observe the approval rate to be higher in the group which received social information indi-
cating a high approval rate in previous experiments, we can conclude that bandwagon motives 




Our experiment involves two times two sessions with four different groups in total. The 
participants of each group sit in one room and they can see their fellow-players and estimate 
their number. The instructions are given in written form and communication is prohibited 
throughout the experiment. We answer arising questions on the instructions in private with the 
individual. At the end of the session, the participants fill in a post-experimental questionnaire 
on biographical information and a number of other questions related to the experiment. One 
                                                 
1
   Note that only bandwagon motives but not the false-consensus effect provide a valid explanation for 
possible differences in approval rates. Given that we find the differences in approval rates suggested by 
the bandwagon theory of voting, we do not elaborate extensively on the impact of a possible false-
consensus effect on voter behaviour. (A text showing that the false-consensus effect does not jeopardize 
our experimental tests is available with the author upon request.) 10 
 
session lasts about 35 minutes and the participants have the chance to earn 10 €. The sessions 
took place within one week in December 2009 at the University of Kassel, Germany and at 
the Justus-Liebig-University Giessen, Germany. A total of 418 undergraduate students par-
ticipated (262 in Giessen and 156 in Kassel). They are studying economics or management 
science in their first year. The four groups are similar with respect to age and sex composi-
tion. 
Like in Tyran (2004), our experimental set-up is based on Tullock’s thought experi-
ment. At the beginning of the session, we endow the subjects with a voucher worth 10 €. Each 
session involves eight voting rounds. In each round, the group has to vote simultaneously on 
the proposal to donate the 10 € to a non-government organisation (NGO) serving a certain 
charitable or common-interest purpose. The individuals’ decisions are anonymous to fellow 
participants and to instructors. The majority rule applies to all rounds but the purpose of the 
NGO changes from one voting round to the next. The organisations include NGOs fighting 
adult illiteracy or helping refugees as well as organizations focussing on environmental pro-
jects (for details see table 1). After the experiment one of the eight voting rounds is chosen at 
random and decisions are executed. If the approval rate in the chosen round is lower than 
50 percent, all participants can cash in their voucher. Otherwise the 10 € of all subjects are 
donated to a NGO of the type stated in the ballot. In each round j (j = 1, ... 8), we inform sub-
jects about the approval rate  j a  observed in earlier sessions of this experiment. This informa-
tion is provided directly before participants decide. We also inform participants that this in-11 
 
formation is usually a good predictor for the behaviour in ballots on the same topic conducted 
among similar groups of participants.
2
 
We implement two treatments with respect to  j a . Participants in treatment TEC receive 
as information the approval rates of students majoring in economics. Participants in treatment 
TMA receive as information the approval rates of students majoring in management science. It 
is important to note that this information is not bogus but each group gets true information 
about the approval rates of students in experimental sessions run by the authors in the two 
years before the experiment. Furthermore, subjects know that the  j a  are calculated from 
these subgroups. In 5 of 8 rounds,  j a differs considerably between TEC and TMA and in 3 
rounds they are similar (see table 1).
3
 In the post-experimental questionnaire, we ask each 
subject i to state the approval rate 
ij a  she expects for each voting round j in her group. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Data from the experiment is used to test for bandwagon behaviour in voting deci-
sions. Our test procedure consists of two steps. Step 1 tests whether different values for  j a  
                                                 
2
   Instructions are available with the authors upon request. 
3
   For reasons of convenience, we deviate from the order of voting rounds in the experiment and report on 
the 5 rounds with treatment-specific differences in  j a first, followed by the 3 rounds without notable dif-
ferences in  j a . The original ordering was 2, 7, 5, 6, 8, 4, 1, 3. 12 
 
lead to systematic differences in 
ij a  between treatments. Accordingly, we arrive at the first 
hypothesis: For all decisions where there is a difference between  j a  in TEC and TMA, the 
average approval rate expected by the subjects 
ij a  is larger under that one treatment for 
which  j a  is larger. A supportive result for this hypothesis is a pre-condition for the validity 
of our test for bandwagon behaviour. We can test for the impact of social information on 
behaviour only if  j a  actually shape expectations. Assuming an affirmative result on the 
first hypothesis, we arrive at our second hypothesis: For all decisions where there is a dif-
ference between  j a  in TEC and TMA, the actual approval rate is larger under that one 
treatment for which  j a  is larger. 
5. Results 
At both universities one session with treatment TEC and one with TMA was run.
4
 Table 
2 shows the approval rates, average 
ij a  and descriptive statistics for the subjects under TEC 
and TMA for all eight issues pooled across universities. The groups are largely identical with 
respect to age, semester of study and sex composition. 
[Table 2 about here] 
                                                 
4
   All four groups consisted of first-year undergraduate students studying economics or management sci-
ence. At both universities, economics and management science students belong to the same faculty and 
take the same classes and exams. The specialization to economics and/or management science only starts 
in the third year of their studies. 13 
 
For the first five issues, the  j a  differ considerably by treatment while only negligible 
differences exist for the last three issues. The 
ij a  are found to differ significantly by treatment 
for the first five issues while no differences are found for issues 6  to 8  (Bernoulli-Test, 
 = 0.05 or 0.01). This result fully confirms our first hypothesis. Turning to our second hy-
pothesis, we find the approval rates to be different for issues 1 to 5 and 7 (t-test resp. Mann-
Whitney-U-test,  = 0.05). The differences for issues 1 to 5 are in line with our second hy-
pothesis, as are the insignificant results for issues 6 and 8. Only the significant result for issue 
7 contradicts our hypothesis.  
There is broad evidence suggesting that female subjects react much more sensitively to 
changes in the environment both in the field and in experiments (Johnson and Eagly, 1989; 
Croson and Gneezy, 2009). We are interested to see whether the differences in approval rates 
observed across treatments in issues 1 to 5 are driven by the behaviour of female subjects 
only. For this purpose, we separate the samples by gender (see table 3). We find significant 
differences in the 
ij a  among male participants for issues 1 to 5 and for female participants for 
issues 1 to 6 (t-test resp. Mann-Whitney-U-test,  = 0.05). There are no inter-gender differ-
ences in expectations (t-test resp. Mann-Whitney-U-test,  = 0.05). In line with the literature 
(e.g., Schlesinger and Heldman, 2001; Corneo and Gruener, 2002; Delaney and O’Toole, 
2008; Piper and Schnepf, 2008) female subjects show higher approval rates for all issues but 
one (issue 6). The majority of these inter-gender-differences are significant (Bernoulli-test, 
 = 0.05). A significant difference in approval rates by treatment is found for issue 1 to 5 and 
7 among female subjects and for issue 1 to 3 and 5 among male subjects (Bernoulli-test, 
 = 0.05). 14 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 6. Conclusions 
Experimental studies in the political science literature find support for bandwagon be-
haviour in voting. However, from an economic point of view, these studies suffer from meth-
odological problems. They primarily analyse voting intentions rather than actual bandwagon 
behaviour in voting decisions. Most studies rely on bogus polls to frame subjects’ social in-
formation and expectations and do not explicitly elicit their expectations with respect to the 
voting behaviour of others. Instead, they implicitly assume that bogus poll results presented in 
the experiments dominate the real-life information that subjects draw on when shaping expec-
tations in experiments. Two experimental studies test for bandwagon motives based on the 
actual expectations of participants concerning the behaviour of their fellow voters. However, 
they cannot rule out the false-consensus effect as an alternative explanation for the observed 
correlation between expectations and voting intentions resp. behaviour.  
To our knowledge, we have presented the first experiment that avoids these methodo-
logical problems. In our experiments, we observe subjects’ decisions in an incentive-
compatible voting environment. We explicitly elicit the subjects’ expectations with respect to 
the behaviour of their fellow-subjects and we do not use bogus polls to shape these expecta-
tions but inform subjects about the actual voting decisions observed in previous sessions of 
the same experiment. We also test for treatment-specific differences in expectations to make 
sure that the social information we provide shapes the subjects’ expectations in the predicted 
way. Our results show that the treatment-specific social information provided to the subjects 
shapes their expectations. Expectations differ significantly for voting rounds where we pre-15 
 
sented different social information in our treatments and they do not differ for those voting 
rounds where similar social information is provided. We test for bandwagon behaviour in 
voting decisions by comparing the approval rates between the two treatments. As predicted by 
the theory of bandwagon voting, we observe significant differences in approval rates between 
treatments in those voting rounds where expectations differ due to different social information 
across treatments. Here, the approval rate was higher among those subjects whose social in-
formation made them expect a higher approval rate among fellow-subjects. Again in line with 
the theory, we do not observe significant differences in approval rates for those voting rounds 
where social information and expectations did not differ across treatments. These results hold 
for female as well as for male subjects. 
Our results clearly show that social information and bandwagon motives shape indi-
viduals’ decisions to approve or reject policy proposals. Thus, it seems reasonable to suggest 
that the public choice literature places a greater emphasis on bandwagon motives in voting 
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TEC - TMA 
j a [%]  j a [%]  j a [%] 
(1) help politically prosecuted (internat.)  56 31 25 
(2) fight adult illiteracy (nat.)  67 29 38 
(3) climate change (internat)  100 31 69 
(4) schools in poor countries (internat.)  50 88 -38 
(5) help civil war refugees (internat.)  33 75 -42 
(6) fight corruption (internat.)  25 23 2 
(7) help disabled children (nat.)  83 85 -2 




Table 2: Average 









ij a  
[%] 







(1) help politically prosecuted (internat.)  56 45.8*** 48.7
# 31 30.2 30.9
(2) fight adult illiteracy (nat.)  67 54.7*** 57.8
# 29 35.7 29.9
(3) climate change (internat)  100 61.9*** 83.9
# 31 35.7 40.2
(4) schools in poor countries (internat.)  50 74.6** 58.0
# 88 81.9 84.6
(5) help civil war refugees (internat.)  33 36.0*** 34.0
# 75 59.9 67.4
(6) fight corruption (internat.)  25 20.3 23.7 23 20.9 22.2
(7) help disabled children (nat.)  83 79.7** 78.5 85 72.0 77.8
(8) environmental preservation (nat.)  56 43.2 57.4 59 48.4 58.5
Descriptive statistics 
average age  21.2 years  21.5 years 
share of female subjects  51.2 %  51.6 % 
n 236  182 
**   significant difference to the other treatment (Bernoulli-Test,  = 0.05) 
***   significant difference to the other treatment (Bernoulli-Test,  = 0.01) 
#   significant difference to the other treatment (t-test resp. Mann-Whitney-U-test ,  = 0.05) 
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j a  
[%] 
approval rate [%]  average 
ij a [%]  j a  
[%] 
approval rate [%]  average 
ij a [%] 
Female  male female male  female male Female male 
(1)  56 47.9*** 44.6*** 49.5
# 48.0
# 31 27.7 33.0 30.9 30.8 
(2)  67 60.3*** 
§§ 48.2*** 57.8
# 57.8
# 29 39.4 31.8 30.1 29.7 
(3)  100 69.4*** 
§§§ 53.6*** 86.4
# 81.3
# 31 40.4 30.7 40.2 40.2 




§§§ 69.3 85,9 83.3 




§§§ 48.9 68.8 65.9 
(6)  25 15.7
§§ 25.9 22.9
# 24.6 23 16.0
§§ 26.1 21,3 23.1 
(7)  83 86.0**
§§§ 72.3 80.2 76.9 85 73.4 70.5 77.3 78.3 
(8)  56 51.2
§§§ 34.8 57.3 57.2 59 52.1 44.3 58.3 58.7 
n  female: 121  male: 112  female: 94  male: 88 
**   significant difference to the other treatment (Bernoulli-Test,  = 0.05) 
***  significant difference to the other treatment (Bernoulli-Test,  = 0.01) 
#   significant difference to the other treatment (t-test resp. Mann-Whitney-U-test ,  = 0.05) 
§§  significant difference to the other gender (Bernoulli-Test,  = 0.05) 
§§§   significant difference to the other gender (Bernoulli-Test,  = 0.01) 
 
 